

War, Aggression and Self-Defence. By Yoram Dinstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, 2005, 349pp + xxv. £29.99

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In an international system characterized by acute decentralization with no centralized authority retaining a monopoly of force to deter and punish wrongdoers, recourse to force remains to be a self-help remedy for states. It is thus not surprising that war, aggression and self-defense have been very topical and subject of various studies. The tragic events of September 11 and the subsequent military campaigns undertaken by the US and coalition forces have further generated a renewed interest in the legal norms that govern the use of force on the international level. Adding to the confusion has also been the Bush administration's depiction of the fight against terrorism as 'war' and frequent appeal to the concept of self-defense (individual as well as collective).

The book under review is not one of those studies carried out as a result of that resurgence of concern with the issue of use of force. It is the fourth edition of Yoram Dinstein's celebrated work on *jus ad bellum*. It was originally published in 1988 following the heightened anxieties of the second Cold War after a number of instances of superpower use of force -for example in Afghanistan and Grenada; other cases of resort to military power such as Israeli intervention in Lebanon (1982), French intervention in Chad (1983); and full-scale conflicts like Iran-Iraq war. The revised and updated editions followed in 1994 and 2001 respectively, including the legal aspects of certain developments, such as the issue of humanitarian intervention after the military campaign in Kosovo of 1998, the applicable jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) together with the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The present edition rises up to the task of integrating the discussion of the questions appeared after a number of events. These include new sections on the consent of States to the use of force; armed attack by non-State actors; examination of the Gulf War and the ensuing occupation of Iraq in 2003; and the immunities from jurisdiction. The present work also takes account of recent judicial statements of the ICJ, pertinent decisions of the Security Council and the final Draft Articles on State responsibility as articulated by the International Law Commission. In addition, reflecting the recent heightened legal attention particularly to the concept of preemption, views on 'interceptive' self-defense as separate from 'preemptive' action and responses to terrorist attacks are further expanded in this most recent edition.

The book comprises of three parts, mainly corresponding to the three concepts of the title. In the first part, Dinstein provides a thorough overview of the legal nature of war, including a detailed discussion of the subject of neutrality, formal beginning and termination of wars and suspension of hostilities. The first chapter examines the concept and meaning of 'war.' After analyzing Oppenheim's definition of war, the author formulates his definition of war as 'a hostile interaction between two or more States.' Making a distinction between war in a technical and material sense, he stipulates that the former connotes 'a formal status produced by a declaration of war,' the latter is 'generated by actual use of armed force, which must be comprehensive on the part of at least one party to the conflict' (p.15). Along with the definition of war, the author also discusses the existing arguments about the *status mixtus*, i.e. intermediate state between war and peace, distinguished by the concurrent operation of the laws of war and the laws of peace.

Acknowledging a range of situations 'short of war' involving limited use of force, Dinstein maintains that in legal terms, 'there are only two states of affairs in international relations –war and peace- with no undisturbed middle ground' (p.16). This clear-cut approach is reflected later in the book in the analyses of legal justifications of various incidents of use of force, such as 1981 Israeli raid on a nuclear reactor under construction in Iraq and the recent US-led invasion of Iraq. In this opening chapter, the author also describes the region of war -the space, where the hostilities can potentially be spread- and the main tenets and rules of neutrality. In the second chapter of Part I, Dinstein examines the course of war. He looks at different modes of terminating war by providing several historical examples. As regards to the suspension of hostilities, the author asserts that cease-fire agreements specify 'an obligation *de jure* to abstain from combat in the course of a war' (p. 50) and outlines 'the conditions under which hostilities are suspended' (p.52). He suggests that there is no such thing as a 'permanent cease-fire' and argues that 'a cease-fire, by definition, is a transition-period arrangement' (p.53). It follows that hostilities may resume without the incidence of an armed attack. When there is no formal peace or armistice agreement, war can be assumed to continue 'unless some supplemental evidence is discernable that neither party proposes to resume hostilities' (p.47). However, this viewpoint does not leave any room for *de facto* end of war by mere cessation of hostilities. In this regard, one can argue that just as war in a material sense does not require a formal declaration and that an armed attack may bring about a war, mutual consent to terminate a war can be implied by long periods of time with no exchange of fire between the belligerent parties. Moreover, if Dinstein's stance is espoused, a number of military campaigns may be considered as part of one ongoing war. Indeed, the author applies this legal reasoning in relation to Israel and Syria and regards that 'Six Days War' of 1967 was not terminated, but interrupted by extended cease-fires, and thus several rounds of military hostilities between Israel and Syria had been part of a single continuing war. Dinstein contends that the treaties of peace in 1979 and 1994 ended the war between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Jordan, on the other, respectively (p.56). In the same vein, he considers the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 as the 'last phase of the Gulf War,' which took place in 1991 following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The legal issue and controversy around the resumption of hostilities as a matter of collective self-defense in response to Iraqi material breach of its obligations under Resolution 687 will be discussed later in this essay. At this point, however, it should be noted that the 'single on-going war' argument has its in-built flaws or mitigated by the facts on the ground that are set by the behavior of states –a factor Dinstein seems to take as an indicator of mutual consent.

The second part comprising chapter 3 to 6 addresses the illegality of war. Dinstein gives a historical outline of the legal status of war. He presents an overview of the doctrines of 'just war' (*bellum justum*) from its Roman origins to the recent conceptualizations of 'just war,' including Kelsen's definition of war as a sanction against a violation of international law, assistance to the national liberation movements and humanitarian intervention. Dinstein contends that nothing in the Charter points to 'a unilateral right' to use force by one State with the aim of 'securing the implementation of human rights' in another. Moreover, he convincingly challenges the interventionist arguments. He underlines that the emphasis of the advocates of humanitarian intervention on the State practice in the nineteenth and early twentieth century does not have any significance at the present time, since 'at the time international law did not hinder the use of force, for whatever reason, good or bad' (p.71). Thus, with regards to humanitarian intervention as part of the just war doctrine revived towards the end of twentieth century, with its rhetorical focus on people 'persecuted by their own Government,' Dinstein reminds that the Charter authorizes the Security Council to take a forcible action and there exists no 'general license' for

the unilateral use of force on humanitarian grounds. Through the historical analysis, Dinstein clearly demonstrates the change in the perception of war, from an entirely legal course to certain exceptions to its legality as developed by the two Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) and the Covenant of the League of Nations. In the following chapter, Dinstein explores the contemporary prohibition of the use of inter-State force, starting with the Kellogg-Briand Pact signifying the landmark in 'the history of the legal regulation of the use of inter-State force' (p.83). He then scrutinizes relevant UN Charter provisions as well as the customary law. In Dinstein's view, the prohibition of force stipulated in Article 2(4) is all encompassing in that it applies to any kind of force regardless of whether or not it constitutes a technical state of war. He interprets Article 2(4) as proscribing 'any use of inter-State force by Member States for whatever reason...unless explicitly allowed by the Charter' (pp.87-88). Dinstein firmly states that the Charter does not allow any individual State 'to act unilaterally, in the domain of human rights or in any other sphere, as if it were the policeman of the world' (pp.90-91). He presents a credible argument regarding peremptory (*jus cogens*) status of the norm contained in Article 2(4). Given that 'consent' in international law is a circumstance which precludes wrongfulness of unlawful acts, Dinstein moves on to deal with the issue of consent by States to the use of force in a new section added to this edition. While 'consensual' military assistance i.e. sending armed forces by one State to another, at the latter's request, is not banned by Article 2(4), Dinstein asserts that States are forbidden to extend any military assistance to the rebels against the legitimate government within another State. As for the consent in advance derived from a prior treaty, Dinstein refers to the regional treaties, especially in Africa, that allow for 'military intervention in internal armed conflicts and in other grave situations' (p.115). He emphasizes that no forcible intervention can be carried out outside the treaty's sphere of application. Although Dinstein mentions the question of treaties of guarantees in this context, he leaves the discussion of the matter to a later chapter. Having left out the relevance of collective defense treaties in the context of 'consent in advance' as a source of abuse (for example, Soviet Union justified its military interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in 1956 and 1968 respectively, on the basis of the right of collective self-defense in accordance with the Warsaw Pact Treaty), the section on 'consent' might arguably have been dealt with more thoroughly.

In Chapters 5 and 6, the focus increasingly shifts to international criminal law due to the nature of the subject matter of aggression. First, the author deals with the criminal aspects of the war of aggression. He maintains that war of aggression currently is a crime against peace under international law. A number of authoritative UN General Assembly resolutions, such as 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States and the 1974 Definition of Aggression as well as various studies carried out by the International Law Commission, Dinstein demonstrates, have consistently endorsed that conclusion. Analyzing individual responsibility for crimes against peace in depth, Dinstein maintains that 'criminal intent' is an essential constituent element of crimes against peace, as it is for any international crime. Although he refers to the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the *High Command* case (1948) that 'As long as there is no aggressive intent, there is no evil inherent in a nation making itself militarily strong' (p.137), he does not discuss this judgment in relation to Israel's bombing of Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, or more recently in the Iranian context. The author moves the focus of analysis to how an individual can be held liable for crimes against peace. In this connection, he discusses admissible and inadmissible individual defenses. Dinstein underlines that the Rome Statute which established permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) lacks a definition of the crime of aggression, and thus although ICC has the jurisdiction (Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute), it will not be able to

exercise it until the Rome Statute is amended so as to provide a common definition of aggression. The analysis of individual responsibility for aggression diverts from the central theme of the book on the permissible conditions of the use of inter-State force under international law.

In the last chapter of Part 2, Dinstein examines repercussions of the change in the legal status of war, i.e the prohibition and the criminalization of aggressive war. He discusses whether a state of war can persist *de jure*, that is in technical sense, after the *de facto* end of hostilities –that is after it ends in the material sense. Although he implies that end of hostilities should terminate the state of war as otherwise creates a ground for governments to restrain individual rights, Dinstein practice of states does not yield to the conclusion that the state of war ends once the hostilities cease. Rather, it continues until parties explicitly consent to its end through a peace treaty. Another aspect he discusses concerns whether the United Nations force may play a role akin to internal police. As aggression is criminalized, Dinstein concludes that United Nations force must aim the unconditional surrender of the opposing side. Dinstein deals with the difficult question of whether *jus in bello* is applied equally to the parties of war, namely to the aggressor State and the State exercising self-defense. He illustrates that not only restricting the equal application of *jus in bello* to all belligerents is conceptually controversial, but also the practice of States demonstrates no change in the validity of that principle. He also adds that UN forces must also comply with *jus in bello* in cases where it is one of the opposing sides in a conflict. Further on, Dinstein examines the issue of impartial neutrality in the context of collective security measures undertaken by the Security Council. Qualified neutrality or ‘non-belligerency,’ Dinstein maintains, refers to the status of a third State discriminating between the two belligerents, thus practically denoting a situation of ‘half-way house’ between neutrality and belligerency. Finally, Dinstein addresses the question of whether illegal resort to force can give way to territorial changes without a consequent treaty. He notes that while unilateral annexation followed by a belligerent occupation is invalid under international law, the issue becomes problematic if it occurs subsequent to the disintegration of the enemy, in which case either the principle of self-determination or the issue of ‘might creating right’ would come into question. In conclusion, Dinstein admits that his remarks were provisional and speculative, as the issue considered has not been a subject to debate in a concrete situation.

Part Three of the book addresses the exceptions to the prohibition of the use of inter-State force, specifically the concept of individual and collective self-defense (chapters 7 to 9), and collective security (chapter 10). In line with the general view, Dinstein asserts that self-defense is a permissible form of forcible self-help and examines general questions pertaining to self-defense. Providing a detailed analysis of the concept, he discusses the delicate issue of preemptive action and seems to side with a restrictive reading of Article 51, namely legitimate self-defense is contingent on the incidence of an armed attack. He convincingly explains that interpreting Article 51 as specifying only one condition under which resort to self-defense is permissible would be ‘counter-textual, counter-factual and counter-logical,’ and argues that preventive use of force against sheer threats will not be in accordance with Article 51. Therefore, the US quarantine on Cuba in 1962 as a response to the installation of Soviet missiles on the island was precluded by Article 51, since self-defense is not permissible in the absence of an armed attack. In the same vein, the Israeli bombing of Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction in 1981, in Dinstein’s view, does not qualify as an act of self-defense, since it is asserted that mere mobilization or ‘bellicose utterances’ do not justify self-defense in the framework of Article 51. Rather, Dinstein argues that Israeli raid could have been justified on the basis of the on-going

state of war (in the technical sense) that characterized the relations between Israel and Iraq. Notwithstanding, he develops the concept of ‘interceptive self-defense,’ according to which the key to invoke legitimate self-defense is not who fired first, but who has engaged in a clear irreversible course of action. Hence, when there is compelling evidence that an armed attack is in the process of being launched, interceptive self-defense is permissible under Article 51. In Dinstein’s words, ‘whereas a preventive strike anticipates a latent armed attack that is merely ‘foreseeable’ (or even just ‘conceivable’), an interceptive strike counters an armed attack which is in progress, even if it still is incipient: the blow is ‘imminent’ and practically ‘unavoidable’” (p. 191). In the present reviewer’s opinion, the distinction is rather between preemptive and preventive strike, whereby the ‘interceptive self-defense’ is akin to preemptive action in its classical meaning as opposed to the way it is utilized in the US National Security Strategy of 2002, i.e. when there is ‘the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation’<sup>1</sup>, rather than prevention of a future threat based on ‘assumptions, expectations or fear.’ Thus, introducing a distinctive concept to the existing debate does not go beyond convoluting the matter further without adding much conceptually as well as practically. In addition, it is not clear how the ‘Six Days War’ of 1967 stands as an example of the Israeli exercise of interceptive self-defense on the basis of the argument that war was inevitable given the aggregate of Egyptian measures (such as the closure of the Straits of Tiran, the build-up of Egyptian forces along Israel’s borders and statements about the imminent fighting), when in fact the anticipation of war could also be seen equally as an assumption that Egypt might have undertaken such acts in the first place. By failing to consider the dangers of abuse apparent in that reasoning and using prevention and preemption interchangeably, Dinstein’s analysis not only complicates the conditions of self-defense, but also contradicts his earlier restrictive approach to Article 51.

In the following chapter, the author delves into the modalities of individual self-defense under two circumstances: self defense as a response to an armed attack *by* a State and self-defense as a response to an armed attack *from* a State. Dinstein asserts that armed reprisals are allowed only when they are defensive and fulfill the requirements of legitimate self-defense, namely necessity, proportionality and immediacy. Yet, this formulation leaves the question of application of the conditions of ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ open, and thus does not provide a clear distinction between punitive and defensive counter-force. For one thing, if force is used in response to a *past* attack, it is not *necessary* and remains punitive, as the harm is already done. If it is used to deter or prevent future attacks, on the other hand, it is equally difficult to apply the key criteria of necessity and proportionality. Thus, it is not clear from Dinstein’s analysis how armed reprisals might be considered permissible form of self-defense from customary international law point of view, let alone under the conditions set by Article 51. Another category of self-defense specified by Dinstein is ‘extra-territorial law enforcement,’ which refers to the use of force by state X against terrorists or armed bands operating within the territory of another state Y, in response to an armed attack mounted from Y’s territory. Dinstein argues that state X has a right to enforce international law extra-territorially as a form of self-defense, when state Y is either unable or unwilling to avoid recurrence of such an attack. Among the historical precedents of invocation of extra-territorial law enforcement, the author refers to the *Caroline* incident and elaborates on the renowned Webster’s formulation of necessity, proportionality and immediacy.

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<sup>1</sup> See note of Webster to British authorities, 27 July 1842, quoted in T. L. H. McCormack, *Self-Defence in International Law, The Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor* (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 1996, 183.

In Chapter 9, Dinstein moves on to examine the 'collective self-defense' as stipulated in Article 51. While acknowledging complexity of interpretation of the concept of 'collective self-defense,' Dinstein asserts that it constitutes the key safety valve against armed attack insofar as the UN collective security system remains ineffective. He notes that the collective self-defense is regulated by the Charter framework, and should be based on the conditions of necessity, proportionality and immediacy. Addressing several types of collective self-defense treaties (mutual assistance treaties, military alliances and treaties of guarantee), the author not only deals with the legal doctrine but also touches upon their implications in the political realm.

The final chapter concerns collective security - a mechanism that institutionalizes the lawful use of force. According to Dinstein, the concept shares with collective self-defense the essential premise that use of force against aggression can be employed by those who are not immediate or direct victims. The author rightly underlines that under the UN Charter, the Security Council is granted a wide discretion to determine what constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, and against who the enforcement action for the maintenance or restoration of the international peace is to be carried out. Although Security Council's decisions are binding, Dinstein argues ICJ may declare any Security Council decision invalid if it decides it to be in contravention with a peremptory norm of general international law.

In the present reviewer's opinion, Dinstein's analysis of the Gulf War and the Iraqi invasion deserves special attention not only as a controversial new issue added to this edition, but also as an unpersuasive argument. The 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent cease-fire terms took place within the framework of Article 2(4) which provides for the general prohibition of use of inter-State force, except self-defense and Security Council authorization. Hence, it follows that unless US could demonstrate that the Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq before March 2003 authorized the use of force, resort to force was not permitted. However, as noted above, Dinstein argues that the Gulf War and the 2003 invasion were part of the same *collective self-defense* action, the exercise of which was blessed by the Security Council Resolution 678, that authorized the Member States 'to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.' According to Dinstein, by virtue of this language, Resolution 678 authorized the use of force for a material breach of Resolution 687. This interpretation is not tenable for many reasons. To begin with, the structure of Resolution 678 suggests that 'all subsequent resolutions' refers to the ten resolutions cited in the preamble, which are related to Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, return of Kuwaiti nationals and property, and other matters (but not related to weapons of mass destruction). Secondly, if a collective self-defense action is allegedly authorized by Resolution 678 'to restore international peace and security in the region' in 2003, then the question is whether Resolution 678 authorizes the use of force indefinitely to restore peace and security in the area. Following this logic would yield to scenarios whereby any outside state could claim such an authority to intervene in Iraq or any other regional country for that matter, say for example Syria or Iran, as it sees fit to restore international peace and security in the area. In neither of the previous authorizations of States (Korea and Southern Rhodesia) by the Security Council, the authorization was subsequently explicitly terminated. Yet neither authorization was later considered valid or at hand for future action after the passage of time over the initial crisis. Thus, the UN practice also does not lend support to the interpretation of Resolution 678 as providing for an authorization of indefinite duration. Likewise, the post-Resolution 678 authorizations, for example authorization of States to intervene in Somalia, were not also expressly terminated. Rather, in the light of the subsequent resolutions which brought alternative

means to deal with the threat to the peace, such as deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia, the authorization is regarded to have dissipated. Further, given that Resolution 678 is an exception to the general norm proscribing the use of inter-State force laid out in Article 2(4), such a broad interpretation of Resolution 678 is not plausible. Thirdly, Resolution 678 expresses that the States that are ‘co-operating with the government of Kuwait’ are authorized to use all necessary means. In 1991, Kuwait notified the Security Council that it had requested the assistance of coalition of states to repel Iraqi forces from its territory. Similarly, the coalition States communicated to the Security Council that their assistance had been requested by Kuwait. In 2003, however, there was no such communication to the Security Council neither by Kuwait nor by the coalition. As Dinstein notes the ICJ too in the *Nicaragua* case has found that collective self-defense may only be exercised by a third state on behalf of a victim state if the victim state requests such assistance. In fact, although Kuwait allowed the US-led forces to use its territory during the invasion, Kuwaiti representative at the Security Council expressed that Kuwait had not participated and would not participate in any military operation against Iraq and all the measures they had taken were to protect Kuwait’s own security, safety and territorial integrity.<sup>2</sup> As such, the absence of a Kuwaiti request from the UN Security Council for an invasion of Iraq and removal of its regime in 2003 together with Kuwait’s careful dissociating itself from these objectives stand as serious challenges to the argument that the US-led coalition was cooperating with the government of Kuwait in a collective self-defense action to achieve the objectives outlined in Resolution 678.

Notwithstanding, Dinstein insists the Security Council authorized the use of force within the ambit of collective self-defense not collective security: ‘Did the armed forces of the Coalition constitute a United Nations force predicated on genuine collective security? The answer is emphatically negative.’ (p. 274). To that effect, he states that the Council did not establish United Nations force for combat purposes against Iraq. The author takes the contention that Resolution 678 was simply a recognition of an inherent right of collective self-defense, as a given, with no reference to the fact that the Security Council expressly passed the resolution under Chapter VII, as in the case of the other authorization resolutions. This rather inarticulate approach overlooks that the absence of agreements for providing the UN with the ‘armed forces, assistance and facilities’ between the Organization and Member States (Article 43), and the non-functioning of a Military Staff Committee (Article 47), have led to the evolution and innovation in the implementation of enforcement measures, such as authorization of the use of force by states in some instances, or recommendation of this type of action in others.

In this connection, Dinstein also fails to note that the ICJ in the *Nicaragua* case limited applicability of collective self-defense by asserting that the illegal acts involving force short of an armed attack do not raise such a right. The Court held as follows:

“In the view of the Court, under international law in force today — whether customary international law or that of the United Nations system— States do not have a right of ‘collective’ armed response to acts which do not constitute an ‘armed attack’.”<sup>3</sup>

Even though Dinstein correctly points out that, the concept of armed attack is expanded to include acts of terrorism, it is not clear how US-led action may be considered as an act of

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<sup>2</sup> See UN Doc. S/PV.4726 (2003).

<sup>3</sup> *ICJ Reports* (1986), para. 211.

collective self-defense, in the absence of an Iraqi armed attack and evidence for Iraq's connection with the 9/11 events.

Finally, in arguing 2003 invasion was the resumption of hostilities, Dinstein employs very general, unscholarly language by asserting 'everybody' had believed that Iraq had not fully observed its disarmament obligations. This is not only a simplistic but also misleading characterization, which overtly disregards enormous discussion by many specialists to the contrary. In contrast to his contention that even the UN inspectors were of a similar opinion, former UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix has repeatedly blamed the US and the UK to have exaggerated the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in Iraq by stating they had 'put exclamation marks where there had been question marks.' A simple search only in the BBC website gives about 177 pages of news items containing the aforementioned Blix's argument both before and after the military action against Iraq. Hence, Dinstein's argument regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq is both legally and politically unsustainable.

In his conclusion, Dinstein refers to the general ban on the use of force as 'aggressive war.' By qualifying 'war,' he leaves the reader with the impression that in his view the use of force is permissible unless it is 'aggressive.' This notion is very confusing as he argues elsewhere in the book that any unilateral use of force, for instance on humanitarian grounds, are forbidden by the Charter framework. Further, Dinstein asserts that collective self-defense even by a broadly based coalition is likely to generate political doubts and legal confusion. The author's observation of such doubts and confusion arose as a result of the occupation of Iraq in 2003 is interesting given that he has not made reference to any of the contending arguments regarding the incident, and rather treated the issue as quite a straightforward self-evident case of resumption of hostilities in the previous chapter. Finally, his conclusion that the range of options available in exercise of the right of self-defense is widened also stands in contradiction with his restrictive analysis of self-defense under Article 51.

As a fourth edition of an influential book published at a time when the topic it addresses has become highly controversial in certain respects, one would expect more attention and detailed scrutiny of the recent challenges brought to international law of war and aggression by the invasion of Iraq, alternative legal arguments and their merits, and the Security Council's role in law-making with respect to individual and collective self-defense. Nonetheless, the critical assessment of certain parts of Dinstein's work in this review is not to dismiss the value of Dinstein's work as an important textbook and guide to the students and practitioners of international law and international relations in several other respects. With its broad scrutiny of the legal aspects of this highly significant subject as well as its extensive references, the fourth edition of Dinstein's book remains to be a valuable contribution to the literature.